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 olmes Rolston Ill's 
New York: Dover, 1979 Environmental Ethics1 is a 
wide-ranging work 
containing many valuable 
insights and suggestions. But 
his account of the human treatment of animals2 is 
seriously confused. It contains arbitrary distinc­
tions which serve as an apologetic for the status 
quo in our society. In this paper I explain the 
problem as Rolston sees it and the solution that 
Rolston offers. After criticizing Rolston's solu­
tion, I propose a significantly different one that 
rests entirely upon views that Rolston endorses. 
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The Problem 
Rolston recognizes that an environmental 
ethic must accept human beings as a part of, 
not apart from, nature. This means that envi­
ronmental ethics must prescribe behavior 
that is natural in the sense that it accords 
with the place of human beings in the bio­
sphere. But what behaviors are natural to 
human beings in relation to animals? It is not 
always clear. For example, people are 
naturally omnivores. So does living in accor­
dance with nature suggest that we hunt and 
raise animals for food? People in most cli­
mates have a natural (at least occasional) 
need for warm clothing. Early human beings 
used animal skins for this and other purposes. 
So is it natural for people to hunt, trap and 
raise animals for pelts and leather? People 
naturally invent tools to help them survive 
and thrive, so does living in accordance with 
nature countenance using animals in medical 
experiments that result in tools (medicines) 
designed to prolong and/or enhance human 
life? Grooming is natural to human beings. 
Does this justify as natural the use of animals 
in experiments needed to safely (and legally) 
market new cosmetics? People are naturally 
curious about animals. Is it, therefore, natural 
for people to confine exotic animals in zoos 
to satisfy human curiosity? 
Rolston's Account 
Rolston claims that human beings are supe­
rior to other animals in having a greater range 
of interests and possibilities. Only we can 
read, write and contemplate religious ques­
tions. Because there is value in the exercise of 
these capacities, human life is typically more 
valuable than the life of any other kind of 
animal. Even where humans and nonhumans 
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share an interest, as people and elk share an 
interest in eating, satisfaction of the human's 
interest should take priority because a well-fed 
human can realize other values (create poetry 
or discover mathematical truths) which well­
fed elk cannot approach (p. 74). 
Rolston does not conclude, as did Kant, 
that only human beings are worthy of 
moral consideration. "From superiority we do 
not move merely to privilege but also to 
responsibility" (p. 77). Human beings "reflect 
the highest awareness of values only when 
they see that humans are not the sole locus of 
value" (p. 78). Thus, for Rolston, human 
superiority is reconciled with a basic concern 
for the well-being of nonhumans by the 
consideration that part of human superiority 
is precisely this ability to be concerned 
about nonhumans. 
Concern for animals is naturalistically 
based, according to Rolston; it rests on 
natural commonalities between human and 
nonhuman animals. Many animals can suffer 
from deprivations of food, water, exercise 
and social intercourse, just as human beings 
do. Animals thus have interests similar to 
the human interest in avoiding such depri­
vations and suffering. Human superiority is 
manifested in part by our acceptance of uni­
versal benevolence and the Golden Rule as 
guides for our own behavior. These suggest 
that, all things being equal, we avoid inflict­
ing harm on animals, and that we relieve 
their suffering when possible (p. 58). 
Rolston approves, for example, of a decision 
requiring a Wyoming rancher to lay down 
part of his fence so that antelope could 
migrate in a hard winter to needed foraging 
lands (pp. 54-55). 
Rolston believes, however, that counter­
vailing principles drawn from ecology are 
often overriding. It is natural for there to be 
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predators and prey in an ecosystem. It is also 
natural for species to evolve through 
intraspecific competition that leaves many 
losers as well as winners (p. 56). Much 
animal suffering, then, makes environmental 
sense. "This urges a nonmeddlesome Golden 
Rule and checks benevolence by the realities 
of ecosystemic nature" (p. 58). Thus, 
"humans have no duties, in interspecific 
environmental ethics, to interrupt the course 
of wild nature" (p. 59). We should express 
our concern about the suffering of wild 
animals by not amplifying the cruelty in 
nature beyond baseline suffering endemic to 
ecosystemic routines. "So far, this is an ethic 
of nonaddition but not of subtraction" (p. 60, 
Rolston's emphasis). "When exploiting 
nature for human interests," we have no 
"obligation to reduce ... [animal] suffering 
below levels found independently of the 
human presence" (p. 59). 
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The foregoing reflects two of the three 
ways in which Rolston would limit the 
human exploitation of animals. First, 
because animals have the same interest as we 
in avoiding suffering, humans should not 
inflict pointless suffering. Second, humans 
should not cause animals to suffer "more, on 
average, than might have been their lot in 
wild nature" (p. 85). 
The third limitation rests on a distinction 
that Rolston makes among human activities 
between those based on nature and those 
based on culture. Because of their superior 
abilities, human beings live in culture as well 
as in nature. For example, "marriage, truth­
telling, promise-keeping, justice, charity ­
these are not events at all in spontaneous 
nature" (p. 81). They reflect superior human 
capacities which are expressed only in culture 
and which form part of interhuman ethics. 
The differences between interhuman 
ethics and environmental ethics are illustrat­
ed by Rolston in reference to interventions 
designed to prevent suffering. Because 
animals do not, and cannot, live in culture, 
we should apply only environmental ethics in 
our relationships with them. As we have 
seen, Rolston maintains that environmental 
ethics should conform to the "realities of 
ecosystemic nature" (p. 58). Thus, a fawn 
should not be saved from predation by a 
grizzly bear. But a human child has a right to 
be saved. "The human victim has a right only 
in relation to other humans, with whom it 
coexists in culture. The grizzly is not violat­
ing human rights when it eats a child, but 
other humans are if they fail to rescue the 
victim" (p. 57). 
Rolston employs the distinction between 
human activities that are in nature and those 
that are in culture to frame his third limita­
tion on the human exploitation of animals. 
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That exploitation must correspond to natural, 
rather than to cultural human pursuits. For 
example, human beings are naturally omni-
vores. "Hunter-gatherer cultures are the earli-
est known, and when agricultural cultures 
replace them, humans have no duty to cease 
to be omnivores and become herbivores" (p. 
80). So eating meat is natural, not merely cul-
tural. People are morally permitted to eat 
meat, then, so long as they inflict no pointless 
suffering and cause animals to suffer "no more, 
on average, than might have been their lot in 
wild nature" (p. 85). 
The killing and eating of animals, when 
they occur in culture, are still events, in 
nature; '" no matter how superimposed 
by culture '" Analogous to predation, 
human consumption of animals is to be 
judged by the principles of environmen-
tal ethics, not those of interhuman 
ethics. (p. 79) 
Rolston extends this logic to other uses of 
animals. He writes: 
There seems no reason to prohibit those 
uses of animals to provide utilities which, 
like food, secure health and basic human 
well-being: leather for shoes, wool for 
jackets, insulin for diabetics. This 
stretches the homologous logic beyond 
that of food chains, but it recognizes that 
in culture there are necessities unknown 
in nature. (p. 85) 
However, such necessities justify the use of 
animals only when they are clearly related to 
natural imperatives, as insulin is related to the 
maintenance of life itself. Desires which are 
more purely cultural do not, according to 
Rolston, justify the use of animals. He objects 
strongly to trapping and killing wild animals 
to make fashionable fur coats. However, 
Domestic fur bearers, which would not 
otherwise exist and are humanely 
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treated, are an intermediary case, but 
even here the fur products are luxuries 
and cannot be made to fit the ecological 
model. Using fur and hide for status 
symbol is something different from using 
them as survival tools. (p. 85) 
On the other hand, Rolston maintains that 
"a carefully regulated harvest" of alligators 
in Louisiana is justified, even though the 
goal is to craft the hides into "ultra chic, ter-
ribly expensive purses and shoes," if "the 
alligator population needs to be cropped for 
its own good or to prevent its becoming a 
nuisance" (p. 84). In addition, he suggests 
acceptability of such uses of alligators 
around the world on the grounds that "the 
survival of the alligator may depend on its 
being economically valuable" (p. 84). 
Though Rolston considers acceptable the 
humane rearing and slaughter of animals for 
food, he objects to ritual methods of slaugh-
ter required by Islamic and Jewish religious 
traditions because "religious methods of 
slaughter result in a degree of suffering and 
distress that does not occur in a properly 
stunned animal" (p. 83). The additional 
"pain is ecologically pointless; it has point 
only culturally and, by the account given 
here, is not justified" (p. 84). 
Critique of Rolston's Account 
I find Rolston's account of our duties 
regarding animals unconvincing. It rests on a 
problematic distinction among human activ-
ities between those which are natural and 
those which are cultural. Because it is prob-
lematic, the distinction leads to arbitrary and 
culturally self-serving differentiations among 
various ways that human beings interact 
with animals. 
The distinction between natural and cul-
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tural human activities is problematic because 
all human activities are cultural. Hominids 
evolved culture and then evolved culturally as 
they evolved biologically. So there never was 
a natural, noncultural human being or human 
pursuit. It is natural, and inevitable, for all 
human activities to be culturally influenced. 
This renders impossible the task which 
Rolston sets himself of differentiating among 
human activities those which are cultural 
from those which are natural. Yet it is largely 
such differentiation that Rolston employs to 
determine our duties regarding animals. All 
other things being equal, animals can be used 
in natural pursuits, but not in cultural ones. 
Most people in the United States condone 
hunting for meat while 
abhorring bullfights, 
conveniently ignoring the fact 
that in modern cultures both 
are recreations, neither is 
necessary, and the animals 
involved are harmed equally. 
Because the basic distinction between 
natural and cultural activities is problematic, 
Rolston's conclusions about what is accept-
able and unacceptable appear arbitrary. As we 
have seen, animals can be used for leather for 
shoes but not for fur coats (p. 85). But what is 
the difference? The human need for shoes is 
no more natural than the human need for 
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coats. Modern people who can obtain substi-
tutes for the fur in coats can equally obtain 
substitutes for the leather in shoes. Why, 
then, is one use impermissible culturally and 
the other permissible naturally? 
A similar arbitrariness characterizes 
Rolston's distinction between humanely 
raising animals for food, which is acceptable 
naturally, and humanely raising animals for 
fur, which Rolston considers "an intermediary 
case" (p. 85), that is, not obviously accept-
able. But how do the cases differ? Clothing 
and food are equally natural needs, and 
animals are no more harmed in humane hus-
bandry for fur than for meat. 
Rolston declares unacceptable culturally 
the use of fur and hides for luxuries and 
status symbols (p. 85). Yet he condones 
hunting alligators for hides that will be 
made into "ultra chic, terribly expensive 
purses and shoes" (p. 84), if "the alligator 
population needs to be cropped for its own 
good" (p. 84). But carnivorous species, such 
as alligators, unlike herbivores such as deer, 
do not cause environmental damage through 
overpopulation, because food supplies 
naturally limit population increases) Again, 
Rolston appears to be making a distinction 
that corresponds to no real difference. Some 
luxury products are condemned while for no 
environmentally sound reason others are 
condoned. 
Another reason Rolston gives for condon-
ing the alligator hunt is that "seventeen of 
twenty-one crocodilian species worldwide are 
endangered ... and some think they can be 
saved only if it can be made economically 
advantageous to native peoples to keep them" 
(pp. 84-85). This may, indeed, be a good strat-
egy to save endangered species, but it is hard 
to reconcile with Rolston's view that only 
natural, rather than cultural, human needs 
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justify harming animals. To the extent that 
any content can be given to the natural/cul-
tural distinction, one would think that the 
kinds of economic considerations alluded to 
would be on the cultural side. Thus, they 
would not render permissible the otherwise 
impermissible hunting of alligators for hides 
for high fashion apparel and accessories. In 
fact, two pages later Rolston himself writes, 
"We want our ethical attitudes toward animal 
suffering to be consistent with ecology, not 
distorted by economics" (p. 86). 
Also puzzling are Rolston's views about 
the relationship between religion and our 
.. treatment of animals. As we have seen, 
Kosher slaughter is condemned as impermis-
sibly causing extra, unnecessary pain to 
animals. The extra pain is unnecessary 
because it is inflicted for purely religious, Le. 
cultural, reasons. But then Rolston refers 
approvingly to the view, associated with 
Ortega y Gasset, that "hunting is not sport; it 
is a sacrament of the fundamental, mandatory 
seeking and taking possession of value that 
characterizes an ecosystem and from which 
no culture ever escapes" (p. 91, Rolston's 
emphasis). Sacraments are associated with 
religion no less than are Kosher laws. So why 
is Kosher slaughter impermissible whereas 
hunting is permissible? Hunting is referred to 
as a sacrament connected with ecosystemic 
laws from which no culture ever escapes. But 
the ecosystemic laws are inescapable, not 
hunting as a sacrament of those laws. 
Rolston himself points out on the same page 
that cameras can replace guns (just as 
modern methods of slaughter can replace 
Kosher methods). So why is not hunting as 
clearly condemned as Kosher slaughter? Both 
are particular, cultural ways of relating to the 
mysteries of life and death. The mysteries 
are universal, but these two methods of 
Between the Species 
relating to the mysteries are equally cultur-
ally particularistic. Neither "sacrament" is 
more necessary than the other to human 
existence. Modern people have no more 
"natural" need for hunting than for Kosher 
meat. Again, Rolston makes a distinction 
that seems arbitrary. 
Rolston's views about medical experimen-
tation on animals are unclear, as he does not 
discuss the topic directly. But his statements 
on related matters seem to have opposite 
implications concerning medical experi-
ments that cause considerable distress to 
animals. On the one hand, he considers it 
natural and permissible for diabetics to use 
animals to get needed insulin. This suggests 
the permissibility of using animals for other 
medical needs, including the testing of new 
drugs and surgical techniques. On the other 
hand, he says that we should not cause 
animals to suffer any more than they would 
in the wild without the presenc~ of human 
beings. Many sensitive laboratory animals 
are bred to be used in extremely distressing 
experiments; such as LO-50 experiments.4 In 
these, a test substance is fed (sometimes 
force-fed) or injected into animals until half 
of the experimental animals die. Because this 
seems harder on the animals than life in the 
wild, it seems that Rolston would have to 
condemn much medical experimentation on 
animals. But such tests are needed for the 
development ofpharmaceutical interven-
tions analogous to the use of insulin. 
Rolston's views on this are not at all clear. 
His views on factory farming should be 
clear, as such farming typically causes animals 
more distress than they would experience in 
the wild away from people. Many farm 
animals are deprived of free movement 
throughout their lives.sYet Rolston fails to 
condemn such farming. Nor does he condemn 
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the consumption of meat from such farms. 
Instead, by mentioning only the permissibility 
of eating meat which is humanely raised and 
slaughtered, he gives the false impression that 
his principles condone eating the meat that 
one typically finds at the grocery store in the 
United States. 
The combined effect of Rolston's pro-
nouncements, uncertainties, and silences is to 
echo popular views, replete with inconsisten-
cies and self-serving blindness. Increasingly 
popular is the view that animals should not be 
trapped for fur. There is increasing unease 
about fur products in general, even those 
obtained from animals reared on farms. But 
most people have not seen that the same logic 
applies to the leather in their shoes and the 
meat on their table. Most people in the 
United States condone hunting for meat 
while abhorring bullfights, conveniently 
ignoring the fact that in modem cultures both 
are recreations, neither is necessary, and the 
animals involved are harmed equally. Most 
people are conveniently ignorant of the suf-
fering of animals on factory farms and in 
medical experiments. Rolston does nothing to 
disturb such people. Instead, he ignores what 
most people ignore and tries to find principles 
to bring consistency to inconsistent, popular 
views. In short, Rolston's account is conserva-
tive in the worst sense. It papers over difficul-
ties in the status quo that a philosopher 
should be exposing. Through the use of arbi-
trary distinctions, it assuages consciences that 
should be disturbed. 
Animals and Evolution 
The following is my suggested alternative 
account of the natural treatment of animals. 
Its premises are drawn entirely from materi-
als found in Rolston's book, though not all 
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the premises are applied by Rolston to ques-
tions concerning the treatment of individual 
animals. I concur with these premises and 
have argued for them elsewhere.6 The point 
here, however, is that they are Rolston's views 
and that they lead to a coherent environ-
mental ethic concerning the treatment of 
animals. 
I begin with Rolston's views that human 
beings are unique in having moral responsi-
bilities and that our responsibility to avoid 
causing unnecessary harm includes the 
responsibility to avoid causing animals to 
suffer or die unnecessarily. I add to these an 
idea of Rolston's, but one which he fails to 
associate with the humane treatment of indi-
vidual animals; it is the idea that the earth's 
fecundity is valuable. Aldo Leopold wrote, 
"the trend of evolution is to elaborate and 
diversify the biota."7 Rolston, correctly, I 
think, sees value in this and derives a human 
duty from it. 
Richar-d Huber, Treasu£..r 
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Nature seems to produce as many 
species as it can, certainly not just 
enough to stabilize an ecosystem, much 
less only species that can directly or 
indirectly serve human needs. Humans 
ought not to inhibit this exuberant lust 
for kinds. (p. 157) 
Elsewhere he writes, "It is not form (species) 
as mere morphology, but the fonnative (speci-
ating) process that humans ought to pre-
serve" (p. 137, Rolston's emphasis). 
P eople should use animals only in ways that do not 
impair the natural evolutionary 
process of speciation. People 
should avoid causing animals to 
suffer or die, except when doing so 
is part of the natural, evolutionary 
process of speciation. People 
should alleviate animal suffering 
and prevent animals deaths only 
when doing so leaves evolutionary 
processes unimpaired. 
I consider this idea to be the key to under-
standing human duties concerning the suffer-
ing and use of animals.8 People should use 
animals only in ways that do not appreciably 
impair the natural evolutionary process of spe-
ciation. People should avoid causing animals 
to suffer or die, except when doing so is part 
of the natural, evolutionary process of specia-
tion. People should alleviate animal suffering 
and prevent animals deaths only when doing 
so leaves evolutionary processes unimpaired. 
Between the Species 8 
These ideas bear significantly on the moral 
appraisal of practices in some technologically 
simple cultures. The (traditional) Inuit in 
Alaska and the !Kyng bushmen in Africa do 
not interrupt the process of evolutionary spe-
ciation; their cultures are compatible with the 
natural diversification of the biotas on earth. 
So people in such cultures are not violating 
duties regarding the biosphere in general 
when they adhere to their ecologically benign 
cultural practices. From the perspective of 
environmental ethics, such people have no 
duty to reduce the suffering caused to animals 
by practices which are essential to the main-
tenance of their culture. Traditional Inuit 
have no duty to cease hunting seals, and 
bushmen have no duty to cease hunting por-
cupines, even though the hunt causes animals 
to suffer and/or die, because this suffering and 
death is the minimum necessary to preserve a 
way of life that preserves the environment. 
The reasoning here parallels that concern-
ing the alleviation of the suffering and death 
of animals in the wild. If wilderness is to be 
preserved, as I believe it should be (in part 
because it is the major locus of natural evolu-
tionary change), then people simply cannot 
intervene so as significantly to ameliorate the 
suffering and death of wild animals. Such 
intervention would destroy wilderness areas as 
wilderness areas. Traditional Inuit and !Kyng 
cultures are fully part of, not apart from, 
wilderness environments. Preserving those 
cultures is as much a part of preserving the 
wilderness environment as is preserving the 
presence of a predator species. Thus, viewing 
people as part of, not apart from their envi-
ronments, and accepting the continued speci-
ation that takes place in wilderness areas as a 
good outweighing associated animal suffering 
and death, yields the view that people should 
let wilderness areas be. Where people are 
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integral to such areas, they should no more be 
disturbed, or disturb themselves, in response 
to animal suffering and death than should 
other environmental constituents be dis-
turbed to ameliorate such suffering or reduce 
the rate of animal mortality. 
On the other hand, the vast majority of 
human beings live in cultures whose presence 
tends to reduce biotic diversity. These are 
agricultural, industrial and post-industrial cul-
tures. People in these cultures cannot claim 
that the animal suffering and death they cause 
is necessary for the preservation of wilderness 
areas and natural speciation. Since an over-
riding need or good is required to justify 
causing any being to suffer or die, some other 
significant consideration(s) will have to be 
adduced to justify practices in modem cul-
tures that cause animal suffering and death. 
For example, innocent people have a right 
to self-defense and to protection by others 
when self-defense is not possible. This is based 
on the idea, elaborated by Rolston (pp. 62-
75), that the human capacities for morality 
and other cultural pursuits make individual 
human beings more valuable than individuals 
of other species. So when push comes to 
shove, as in cases of self-defense and the 
defense of individual human beings from 
animal attacks, animals should be sacrificed 
for human welfare. But a technologically 
sophisticated culture can and should arrange 
matters so as to minimize attacks by animals, 
for example, by not breeding and training 
dogs for fighting and guard duty. 
Other examples of permissible animal sacri-
fice in technologically sophisticated culture 
are also based on the idea that if human 
beings are more valuable than any other 
beings, then it is reasonable that human 
beings cause animals to suffer and die when 
this is truly necessary for the preservation of 
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human life. Thus, where no alternatives are 
feasible, it is legitimate to kill animal pests 
who threaten human health or vital human 
food supplies. Similarly I in those relatively 
rare cases when animal experimentation is 
required to meet pressing human health 
needs, medical experimentation on animals is 
justified. This is not to say, however, that 
most current practices concerning animal 
pests and medical experimentation on 
animals are justified. It is merely to say that, 
granting greater value to people than to any 
other of the environment's constituents, one 
can imagine situations in which some use of 
animal extermination and experimentation 
would be justified. 
Where vital human needs are not at issue, 
significant impositions on animals are unjusti-
fied, except when needed to reestablish eco-
logical balances that people have upset. 
Rolston is correct, I believe, when he objects 
to a rancher's (largely unnecessary) stretch of 
fencing that blocked antelope from migrating 
as usual, and as needed, to winter foraging 
areas (pp. 54-55). But in light of the premises 
he accepts. Rolston should add considerably 
to the list of impermissible activities in tech-
nologically sophisticated cultures. 
People in modem cultures have no real 
need for products made with fur or leather. 
Killing animals to provide materials for such 
products is totally unjustified, even if the 
animals are raised humanely for this purpose, 
because killing an animal (obviously) harms it 
greatly, and thus requires a strong justifica-
tion. Where there is no real need for products 
made with leather or fur, there is insufficient 
justification. A fortiori, painful trapping 
methods are unjustified. 
Hunting and fishing are also unjustified, 
except when they serve the needs of human 
subsistence. Since meat is nutritionally super-
9 Between the Species 
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£luous in the human diet, anyone who has 
alternatives available should avoid killing 
animals for food. 
By the same token, people who have avail-
able alternatives, e.g., virtually everyone in 
the United States, should avoid eating the 
meat of animals killed by others and should 
avoid raising animals to be killed for their 
meat. Even when the animals are raised 
humanely, killing them is unjustified. A ferr-
tiori, factory farming, which causes great 
animal suffering, is unjustified. 
Many species of animals suffer greatly under 
the conditions of confinement characteristic 
of most zoos. Human curiosity about these 
animals is not a need of such magnitude as to 
justify causing this suffering, especially since 
books, wildlife photography, and films can 
meet whatever need exists. 
Animal entertainments are fine so long as 
the animals involved are among those being 
entertained. It is hard to imagine much joy for 
the animals in a cockfight or bullfight. I 
remain skeptical of trainers' and owners' 
claims that their dogs and horses really enjoy 
or crave racing as hard as they do. But I have 
seen dogs fetch sticks with apparent enjoy-
ment. The event did not draw a paying crowd, 
however. 
In sum, people should not cause animals to 
suffer or die unnecessarily, because suffering 
and death are harmful. In light of the value of 
natural speciation in the biosphere, however, 
people should not intervene in the wild to 
ameliorate animal suffering. For the same 
reason, people living in technologically simple 
cultures (which do not impair natural specia-
tion) have no duty to renounce practices 
essential to their cultures which cause animals 
to suffer and die. Because normal human 
beings are of greater value than are individual 
animals, innocent people have a right to self-
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defense and to defense by others in case of 
animal attack. They are also justified in some 
extermination of animal pests and in some use 
of animals in medical experiments. But 
because people in technologically sophisticat-
ed cultures have no need for fur, meat, and 
leather, all rearing and killing of animals to 
secure these products is impermissible. Simi-
larly, since people have no need for recreations 
that harm animals, such as hunting, fishing 
and horse racing, these recreations are also 
impermissible. Abiding by these limitations, 
we fulfill our role as the biosphere's morally 
responsible members. While our natural supe-
riority gives us the privilege of self-defense, 
defense of innocent human beings, and rights 
to limited extermination and experimenta-
tion, it denies to us products and pursuits that 
involve unnecessary suffering and death. This, 
I believe, is treating animals naturally. 
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